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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:
Case No. 20000719-CA

v.
CORINNE SKIDMORE,
Defendant/Appellant.

:

Priority No. 2

:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a sentence for possession of a controlled substance with
intent to distribute in a drug-free zone, afirstdegree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37-8 (Supp. 2001), in the First Judicial District Court of Cache County, State
of Utah, the Honorable Thomas L. Willmore, presiding. This Court has jurisdiction
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Issue No. 1: Where defendant's sentencing claims are neither supported by the
record nor adequately briefed, can she show that her due processrightswere jeopardized
by the trial court's inactions or that her sentence is "inherently unfair"?

1

Standard of Review: "The imposition of sentence 'rests entirely within the
discretion of the [trial] court, within the limits prescribed by law.'" State v. Schweitzer,
943 P.2d 649, 651 (Utah App. 1997) (citations omitted). "As such, '[an appellate court]
review[s] the sentencing decisions of a trial court for abuse of discretion.'" Id. (citing
State v. Houk, 906 P.2d 907, 909 (Utah App. 1995)). An appellate court mayfindan
abuse of discretion "only if [it] concludes that 'no reasonable [person] would take the
view adopted by the trial court.'" Id. (citing State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah
1978)).
Issue No. 2: Given the strong evidence of defendant's guilt and the prosecutor's
unwillingness to reduce the first degree felony charge in exchange for defendant's guilty
plea, was defense counsel's representation sufficient?
Standard of Review: Ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims on direct appeal are
reviewed as a matter of law. State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following are reproduced in Addendum A:
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (1999);
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (Supp. 2001);
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (1998);
Utah R. App. P. 24.

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by information with possession of a controlled substance
with intent to distribute in a drug-free zone, afirstdegree felony, and possession of drug
paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor. R. 14-15.
On May 19, 2000, defendant waived her right to a preliminary hearing and entered
a "not guilty" plea. R. 22-23. She later entered into a plea agreement with the State,
pleading "guilty" to Count I, possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute
in a drug-free zone, a first degree felony. R. 29-37; 70:2-8. In response, the State agreed
to dismiss Count II, possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor. R. 20-21;
68:1; 70:8. The court entered defendant's guilty plea and ordered a presentence report
("PSI"). R. 27; 70:8.
Prior to sentencing, defendant filed a motion to reduce her sentence to a second
degree felony pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (1999). R. 40-41. The court
denied defendant's motion and sentenced her to an indeterminate term of five years to life
in the Utah State Prison. R. 13-16. Defendant timely appeals her sentence. R. 45-46.
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1
On March 7, 2000, using a no-knock warrant, police entered defendant's house,
located one house away from Lewiston Elementary School, to search for drugs and drug
paraphernalia. R. 68:3. Officer Brent Auman encountered defendant in her garage. Id.
Defendant immediately told Officer Auman that she frequently used methamphetamine
and had injected the drug just prior to their entry. Id. Officer Auman noticed that
defendant's arms bore numerous puncture wounds from needle injections. Id.
The contraband. Defendant then led the officers to the location of the drugs in her
house. Id. Inside a metal strong box, officers discovered two plastic containers; one
contained a large rock of "crack" and the other contained a large amount of crystal meth.
R. 68:3-4. The box also contained a set of plastic scales, syringes, a tourniquet, a spoon,
a glass pipe, straws, numerous small plastic baggies and envelopes, and two small metal
containers holding small plastic baggies of pre-measured meth. Id.
A further search of defendant's house revealed additional contraband. Id. On top
of the refrigerator officers discovered a straw, a mirror spotted with drug residue, and a
razor blade. Id. In defendant's bedroom, inside her top dresser drawer, was a meth pipe
containing drug residue, a straw, and a razor blade. Id. Under defendant's night stand
was a gray metal money box containing $1,580.00 in cash. Id. On top of that night stand

1

The facts are taken primarily from the PSI, including both defendant's version
and the official version of the events.
4

was a notebook containing the names of defendant's drug customers, dollar amounts, and
the amount of drugs those individuals had purchased. Id. A similar notebook also
containing drug sale information and $206.00 in cash was found within defendant's day
planner. Id. On a shelf in defendant's craft room was a box of unused syringes, a
propane torch, and a mirror which held two straws and a small rock of "crank." Id. The
total weight of the drugs seized amounted to nearly 20 grams of meth. R. 68:4.
Building a case against defendant. The prior year, Detective Mitch Frost
received several reports of defendant's drug use from a confidential informant. R. 68:1-2.
The informant notified Detective Frost of the large amount of traffic at defendant's
residence, and that the occupants of those vehicles would quickly come and go from
defendant's house. R. 68:2. Given Detective Frost's background and training, he
recognized that type of traffic pattern as consistent with drug distribution. Id.
Additionally, North Park Police Officer Roger Jardine contacted Officer Auman
concerning defendant's drug distribution activities. Id. Before beginning work as a fulltime police officer in the fall of 1999, Officer Jardine worked with defendant at
Pepperidge Farms. Id. At work, Officer Jardine was told by other employees that
defendant was dealing meth. Id. Officer Jardine observed defendant meet during the
lunch hour in the parking lot with other employees suspected of using meth. Id. Those
individuals would briefly meet defendant at her car and then leave to go to their own cars.
Id. Other employees told Officer Jardine that those employees would meet defendant,
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purchase drugs from her, and then return to their own vehicles to use the drugs. Id.
In February, 2000, another confidential informant informed Detective Frost that
defendant was using and distributing meth. Id. Detective Frost considered that informant
to be reliable. Id.
In response to that information, Detective Frost and Drug Task Force Agent Justin
Peterson began to conduct their own investigation into the matter. Id. On February 24,
2000, they searched defendant's trash can after it had been placed on the edge of the road
for pickup. Id. Inside they found many used syringes, some with brownish liquid residue
inside and some with what appeared to be blood residue inside. Id. The brownish liquid
tested positive for meth. Id. Through the officer's training they identified the blood as
evidence that the substance was injected inside the user's vein and not muscles as is done
in giving insulin injections for diabetes. Id. Further, the officers recognized that insulin
is a clear liquid not consistent with the brownish colored liquid they discovered. Id.
Finally, the officers discovered a letter addressed to defendant and many small plastic ziplock baggies commonly used to package meth. Id.
On March 2, 2000, Detective Frost, Agent Peterson, and Drug Task Force Agents
Rob LeVan and Shand Nazer again searched defendant's trash can after it had placed on
the edge of the road for pickup. Id. Again they found many syringes containing brownish
liquid which again tested positive for meth and blood residue. Id. Additionally, they
found a small zip-lock baggie and a plastic bag which was knotted and had the comer
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pulled off. Id. The missing comer was also located. Id. The officers recognized that the
knot in the plastic bag and the torn comer were consistent with drug packaging and
removal practices. Id. Various bills and letters containing defendant's name and address
were also located in the trash can. R. 68:2-3. Based on the above information, the
officers requested the no-knock search warrant they later served on defendant. R. 1-2, 710; 68:3.
Defendant confesses. In addition to her signed written confession contained in the
plea agreement (R. 29-37), defendant also confessed her guilt to the PSI investigator. R.
68:4. In that confession, defendant wrote, "I was a meth user and I did sell it. I do admit
it was wrong." Id. Defendant explained that she sold the drugs because "[i]t was an easy
way to make money." Id. She also indicated that she willingly cooperated with the police
when her home was searched. Id.
During a conversation with the investigator, defendant admitted that she had been
using and selling meth for two and a half years prior to her arrest. Id. She also admitted
to buying one-half to one ounce per week, sometimes twice during a week, and that her
daily use was between one-half to three-quarter grams. Id.

1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I: Defendant claims that her due process rights were violated when the
trial court allegedly did not follow through with its sympathetic offer to write a letter to
the Board of Pardons listing certain mitigating factors and encouraging early parole.
However, defendant's claim is completely unsupported by the record and therefore
inadequately briefed. Notwithstanding those procedural inadequacies, defendant cites no
authority, and the State is aware of none, obligating the trial court to write such a letter
whether offered or not.
Although defendant concedes that her sentence is lawful, she also claims that it is
"inherently unfair." She cites four assertions as to support her claim. Each of those
assertions is frivolous.
POINT II: Defendant also claims that her counsel was ineffective for a variety of
reasons. This claim fails because none of those reasons are supported by the record. In
any event, given the State's overwhelming evidence against defendant and the
prosecutor's unwillingness to offer a reduction of the first degree felony in exchange for
defendant's guilty plea, defendant cannot show that her counsel's actions fell below the
objective standard of reasonable assistance, nor that she was prejudiced in any manner.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT CANNOT SHOW EITHER THAT HER
DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WERE JEOPARDIZED BY
THE TRIAL COURT'S ALLEGED INACTIONS, NOR
THAT HER SENTENCE IS "INHERENTLY UNFAIR"
Defendant claims that she was substantially denied due process which resulted in a
sentence that was inherently unfair. Br. of Aplt. at 12. In essence, defendant's claim is
separable into two distinct assertions: (1) defendant claims that the trial court did not send
a letter noting the mitigating circumstances of her offense to the Board of Pardons, thus
denying her due process; and (2) although defendant concedes that her sentence is lawful,
she claims that the circumstances surrounding her crime illustrate that her sentence is
inherently unfair and unduly harsh. Br. of Aplt. at 12-17. For the reasons set forth below,
defendant's claims are frivolous.
At sentencing, the trial court noted that it had received the PSI and then heard
argument from defense counsel and the prosecutor, and statements by defendant's
relatives. R. 69:3-13. Then, the court imposed the following sentence:
Ms. Skidmore, your case today has caused me more concern than all
the cases I've got for sentencing today. I've spent a lot of time going over
this report, looking at the file, trying to decide what to do.
On one hand I see a person that has very minimal involvement with
the criminal justice system. I see a person that's got relatively good family
support. I appreciate them here today and the comments that they've made.
In the presentence report you were very upfront [sic] with AP&P and
with the police. There's been some discussion concerning that.
The difference between what [the prosecutor] points out, as far as
9

another sentencing case, is that that was purely for profit. Yours was for
profit and for your own use.
The problem that I've got with this case, and what causes me so
much concern, is that when the police did come to your house there were
almost 20 grams of meth. There was over $1,500 worth of cash. And your
day planner contained names and dollar amounts and people you had sold
drugs to. This just wasn't simply you using. It was one house away from
Lewiston Elementary school.
You sold, you told the probation officer, because it was an easy way
to make money. You sold for over two-and-a-half years for an income to
support your habit. And I appreciate the fact that you were honest with
AP&P when you did tell them that, but that's a lot of sales over that point in
time, a lot of distribution. That's a lot of lives affected by this terrible drug,
as Mr. Breeze has so eloquently pointed out.
In your own statements to AP&P you were using a half to one ounce
per week, using and selling. And that is a lot of drugs over two-and -a-half
years of this terrible drug being distributed through this community.
I have looked at and weighed very carefully, is there any other thing
I can look at besides prison? Yes, there are things I could look at. But you
need to understand that my job is to weigh not only punishment to you, but
also deterrence to you for the future. And I think that you're well on the
way for yourself as far as controlling this habit, but you need more than just
walking away cold turkey. Then there is also general deterrence which
needs to be looked at as far as not allowing distribution of
methamphetamine in this community.
Base upon that I am going to follow—Mr. Breeze has made an
excellent, eloquent argument, but I want you to understand my decision
here today is based after a lot of deliberation, trying to figure out what's
best for you and what's best for this community. I am going to follow the
recommendation. I am sentencing to you [sic] five years to life in the Utah
State prison.
R. 69:13-15.
As a sympathetic gesture, the court then offered to write a letter to the
parole board, pointing out various mitigating factors such as defendant's
cooperation with police and defendant's familial support, and encouraging the
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board to consider early release into a halfway house or treatment center. R. 69:15.
The court stressed, however, that its principal duty is to society—to stop the flow
of drugs and send a message to other drug criminals. Id. Finally, the judge
advised defendant to maintain hope and take advantage of the drug treatment and
education programs available at the state prison, and noted that her involvement in
those programs would be viewed favorably by the parole board. R. 69:16.
Toward the end of the hearing, defendant reminded the court of her section
76-3-402 Motion to Sentence as a Second Degree Felony, claiming that the Board
of Pardons would also have discretion to parole her early under a reduced
sentence. Id. The court, however, denied defendant's motion based on the facts
and circumstances of her case. Id.
"A sentence will not be overturned on appeal unless the trial court has abused its
discretion, failed to consider all legally relevant factors, or imposed a sentence that
exceeds legally prescribed limits." State v. Nuttall, 861 P.2d 454,457 (Utah Ct. App.
1993); accord State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133, 1135 (Utah 1989); State v. Schweitzer,
943 P.2d 649, 651 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). "An abuse of discretion may be manifest if the
actions of the judge in sentencing were 'inherently unfair' or if the judge imposed a
'clearly excessive' sentence." State v. Russell, 791 P.2d 188, 192-93 (Utah 1990)
(quoting State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978)). "The exercise of discretion in
sentencing necessarily reflects the personal judgment of the court and the appellate court
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can properly find abuse only if it can be said that no reasonable [person] would take the
view adopted by the trial court." Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887.
A.

Defendant's claim that the trial court did not send a "mitigating letter" to the
Board of Pardons as promised is unsupported by the record and therefore
inadequately briefed; in any event, defendant fails to cite any authority
obligating the trial court to send such a letter.
Defendant's claim that she was denied due process when the trial court allegedly

did not send a "mitigating letter" to the Board of Pardons as promised is unsupported by
the record and, therefore, inadequately briefed. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) ("The
argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the
issues presented . . . with citations to the . . . parts of the record relied on.").
Although defendant claims that the trial court's alleged inaction denied her due
process, she points to no record evidence showing that the court failed to send such a
letter, nor any record evidence that the Board of Pardons did not receive it. See Br. Of
Aplt. at 11-17.2 Accordingly, this Court should consider defendant's unsupported factual
allegations inadequately briefed, and presume the regularity of the proceeding below. See
Butler, Crockett and Walsh Dev. Corp. v. Pinecrest Pipeline Operating Co., 909 P.2d
225, 230 (Utah 1995) ("[An appellate court] will not accept as true factual allegations in

Concurrent with this brief, the State has filed a Motion to Strike Extra-Record
Factual Material From Appellant's Brief. In that motion, the State requests that a
purported letter from defendant's appellate counsel addressed to the Board of Pardons
and a purported newspaper article, both presented as appellant's Addendum B, and any
references thereto, be stricken from appellant's brief, as this material is not present in the
record.
12

briefs not properly cited to the record."); State v. Willett, 909 P.2d 218, 221 (Utah 1995)
(failure to cite to the record in a brief is grounds for assuming regularity in the
proceedings below).
Notwithstanding defendant's failure to support her claim with proper record
citation, defendant cites no authority, and the State is aware of none, obligating a trial
court to send a "mitigating letter" to the Board of Pardons. See Br. of Aplt. at 12-17. To
the contrary, any recommendation offered by the trial judge to the Board amounts simply
to that judge's non-binding personal opinion and is neither mandated nor prohibited by
law. See State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 46, f 75, 979 P.2d 799 (trial judge's recommendation
to the Board of Pardons was a non-binding personal opinion); Labrum v. Board of
Pardons, 870 P.2d 902, 907 (Utah 1993) (under the Utah indeterminate sentencing
scheme, "the trial judge has no discretion in fixing the term of imprisonment") (citations
and quotations omitted)). Therefore, defendant has not shown that the trial court's
actions were unreasonable or that it abused its discretion in any manner. See Gerrard,
584 P.2d at 887.
B.

Defendant fails to offer any legitimate reasons supporting her claim that her
sentence is "inherently unfair.'5
While defendant concedes that her sentence is lawful, she lists four reasons why

she claims it is "inherently unfair." See Br. of Aplt. at 12, 15-17. Each lacks merit.
First, defendant claims that the trial court improperly delegated to the Board of
Pardons its determination of defendant's section 76-3-402 Motion to Sentence as a
13

Second Degree Felony. Br. of Aplt. at 16.3 However, at sentencing the court denied
defendant's motion based on the facts and circumstances of defendant's case. See R.
69:13-16. Thus, defendant's first assertion as to why her sentence is "inherently unfair"
is contradicted by the record.
Second, defendant claims that her conviction of a first degree felony was "due to
the fact that she resided within a 1000 [feet of] a school[,]" and had she been residing
elsewhere, under Utah Code Ann. § Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 she would have been
convicted of only a second degree felony. Br. of Aplt. at 16. Without citing any
authority, defendant further asserts that the legislative intent of section 58-37-8 was only
to prevent drugs from being sold to students, and because she was not selling to students,
the mandatory sentencing increase to a first degree felony under section 58-37-8 should
not apply to her. Id. at n.3. Defendant's second assertion runs contrary to a plain
language interpretation of section 58-37-8, and therefore lacks merit.
Section 58-37-8 states that possession of a controlled substance within 1000 feet of

3

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (1999) provides in relevant part:

(1) If the court, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the offense
of which the defendant was found guilty and to the history and character of
the defendant, concludes it would be unduly harsh to record the conviction
as being for that degree of offense established by statute and to sentence the
defendant to an alternative normally applicable to that offense, the court
may unless otherwise specifically provided by law enter a judgment of
conviction for the next lower degree of offense and impose sentence
accordingly.
14

a school is punishable as a first degree felony. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (Supp.
2001). A plain language reading of section 58-37-8 reveals that the legislature intended
to punish as a first degree felony not only the sale of drugs to students, but any possession
of drugs by anyone within 1000 feet of a school. See State v. Stromberg, 783 P.2d 54, 5960 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (the plain language of section 58-37-8 clearly increases the
punishment for convicted drug offenders, whether trafficking or not, where the offenses
occurred with 1000 feet of a school). Accordingly, defendant's second assertion
contradicts the plain language section 58-37-8 and does not show that her sentence was
"inherently unfair." See id.
Third, defendant argues that her sentence is "inherently unfair" because the
amount she admitted to consuming—one-half to three-quarter grams of meth per
day—and the nearly twenty grams of meth discovered at her home were for personal use
and sold only to support her habit. Br. of Aplt. at 16. However, together with her
confession that she sold drugs for two-and-a-half years, the trial court appropriately
considered this claim as an aggravating rather than mitigating factor. See R. 69:13-14.
Cf. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649, 651 ("The imposition of sentence 'rests entirely within the
discretion of the [trial] court, within the limits prescribed by law.'" (citations omitted));
Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887 ("The exercise of discretion in sentencing necessarily reflects
the personal judgment of the court and the appellate court can properly find abuse only if
it can be said that no reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the trial
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court."); Russell, 791 P.2d at 192 ("One factor in mitigation or aggravation may weigh
more than several factors on the opposite scale."). Thus, defendant's third assertion
lacks merit.
Fourth, defendant claims that the fact that she was not found operating a
clandestine lab is another mitigating factor which the court did not consider, therefore,
making her sentence "inherently unfair." Br. of Aplt. at 16. This claim, however, is not
relevant to her present charges. See R. 14-15. That she did not commit an additional
crime does not entitle her to a more lenient sentence for the crime she did commit.
Further, in light of defendant's confession to the PSI investigator that she purchased the
drugs in Ogden and then re-sold them to make a profit, the allegation that defendant may
not have manufactured drugs is hardly a mitigating factor. See R. 68:4. Accordingly,
defendant's fourth reason for claiming that her sentence is "inherently unfair" also fails.
Given defendant's failure to support her argument with any legitimate reasons as
to why her sentence is "inherently unfair," or to show that the trial court abused its
discretion regarding a promised recommendation to the Board of Pardons, defendant's
indeterminate sentence of five years to life for her first degree felony conviction must
stand.

16

POINT II
DEFENSE COUNSEL'S REPRESENTATION WAS
ADEQUATE GIVEN THE STRONG EVIDENCE OF
DEFENDANT'S GUILT AND THE PROSECUTOR'S
UNWILLINGNESS TO REDUCE THE FIRST DEGREE
FELONY CHARGE IN EXCHANGE FOR
DEFENDANT'S GUILTY PLEA
Defendant next claims that she received ineffective assistance from her counsel.
Br. of Aplt. at 17-22. Defendant lists a myriad of allegations against her counsel
including: 1) counsel did not challenge the evidence presented against defendant at any
hearing; 2) counsel encouraged defendant to waive the preliminary hearing; 3) counsel
encouraged defendant to plead guilty; 4) at sentencing, counsel emphasized how meth
was a terrible drug; 5) once the plea agreement was reached, counsel did not offer the
tentative version of the agreement to the court for review under rule 11(h)(2), Utah Rules
of Criminal Procedure; 6) although counsel properly filed a section 76-3-402 Motion to
Sentence as a Second Degree Felony, he did not list all possible mitigating factors in that
motion; 7) counsel did not conduct a reasonable investigation into the facts surrounding
defendant's case; and 8) counsel did not "follow-up" on the trial court's offer to write a
"mitigating letter" to the Board of Pardons. Br. of Aplt. at 18-22. Each of those
allegations lacks merit.
To show ineffective assistance of council under the Strickland test, "a defendant
must first demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient, in that it fell below an
objective standard of reasonable professional judgment." State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76,
17

1fl9, 12 P.3d 92 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-89 (1984) (other
citations omitted)). "Second, the defendant must show that counsel's deficient
performance was prejudicial—i.e., that it affected the outcome of the case." Id. Accord
State v. Kelley, 2000 UT 41, f25, 394 Utah Adv. Rep. 3.
Defendant bears the heavy burden of establishing her counsel's ineffectiveness, by
providing supporting arguments which cite the record. See Litherland, 2000 UT 76,fflf8,
11. "[P]roof of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be a speculative matter but must
be a demonstrable reality." Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993). ""If an
appellant fails to provide an adequate record on appeal, this Court must assume the
regularity of the proceedings below."" Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 11 (quoting State v.
Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1226 (Utah 1997) (quoting Jolivet v. Cook, 784 P.2d 1148,
1150 (Utah 1989) (additional citations omitted)).
Here, defendant presents no record evidence to support her claims and, therefore,
does not meet her burden under Strickland. In particular, defendant claims that counsel
encouraged her to plead guilty, failed to conduct a reasonable investigation, and that
counsel did not "follow-up" on the "mitigating letter" offered by the trial judge, yet
defendant fails to list any record support for those claims. See Br. of Aplt at 18-22.
In any event, because the State had ample evidence against defendant and was
unwilling to compromise to obtain a guilty plea, defendant cannot show that her counsel's
actions were either unreasonable or prejudicial. The evidence against defendant was
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strong: two reliable confidential informants separately informed police of defendant's
drug trafficking activities (see R. 68:1-2); on two occasions police lawfully obtained a
massive amount of incriminating evidence from defendant's trash {see R. 68:2-3); Officer
Jardine, a former co-worker, witnessed defendant's drug activities and informed police of
what he observed (see R. 68:2); during the search of defendant's home, she willingly
showed police where her drugs were located (see R. 68:3-4); police obtained numerous
items of incriminating evidence from their lawful search including drug paraphernalia,
names and addresses of her drug customers and the amount of drugs that each customer
had purchased, nearly twenty grams of meth, and over $1500 cash (see id.); needle marks
on defendant's arms and her confession to police established her guilt (see R. 68:3); and
defendant's home is located within 1000 feet from Lewiston Elementary (see id.).
Clearly the State had ample evidence to convict defendant of both possession of a
controlled substance with intent to distribute in a drug-free zone, a first degree felony, and
possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8
(Supp. 2001); Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (1998). Further, given this evidence, the
prosecutor refused to plea bargain down from the first degree felony. See R. 69:12.
Under those circumstances, defense counsel did the only thing he could—encourage
defendant to plead guilty to the first degree felony in exchange for dismissal of Count II,
possession of drug paraphernalia, and file a section 76-3-402 Motion to Sentence as a
Second Degree Felony.
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In light of defendant's failure to present record evidence supporting her claim, the
strength of the State's case against defendant, and the prosecutor's willingness to dismiss
only Count II of the charges in exchange for a guilty plea, defendant cannot show that her
counsel's actions fell below the objective standard for effective assistance, nor that she
was prejudiced in any fashion by counsel's actions. See State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232,
240 (Utah 1992) (the more evidence supporting a conviction, the less likely there was
harmful error). Accordingly, defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm
defendant's sentence.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / 7

•Hi

day of September, 2001.

MARK L. SHURTLEFF
ATTORNEY GENERAL
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

(1) If the court, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the offense
of which the defendant was found guilty and to the history and character of the
defendant, concludes it would be unduly harsh to record the conviction as being
for that degree of offense established by statute and to sentence the defendant
to an alternative normally applicable to that offense, the court may unless
otherwise specifically provided by law enter a judgment of conviction for the
next lower degree of offense and impose sentence accordingly.
(2) If a conviction is for a third degree felony the conviction is considered to
be for a class A misdemeanor if:
(a) the judge designates the sentence to be for a class A misdemeanor
and the sentence imposed is within the limits provided by law for a class
A misdemeanor; or
(b) (i) the imposition of the sentence is stayed and the defendant is
placed on probation, whether committed to jail as a condition of
probation or not;
(ii) the defendant is subsequently discharged without violating his
probation; and
(iii) the judge upon motion and notice to the prosecuting attorney,
and a hearing if requested by either party or the court, finds it is in the
interest of justice that the conviction be considered to be for a class A
misdemeanor.
(3) An offense may be reduced only one degree under this section unless the
prosecutor specifically agrees in writing or on the court record that the offense
may be reduced two degrees. In no case may an offense be reduced under this
section by more than two degrees.
(4) This section may not be construed to preclude any personfromobtaining
or being granted an expungement of his record as provided by law.

(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to
knowingly and intentionally:
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance;
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree,,
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit
substance;
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to
distribute; or
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where:
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct
which results in any violation of any provision of Title 58,
Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d that is a felony; and
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more
violations of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on
separate occasions that are undertaken in concert with five or
more persons with respect to whom the person occupies a position
of organizer, supervisor, or any other position of management.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to:
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II or a controlled substance analog is guilty of a second degree felony and upon a second or
subsequent conviction is guilty of a first degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is
guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent
conviction is guilty of a second degree felony; or
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of
a third degree felony.
(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of Subsection
(lXaXii) or (iii) may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate
term as provided by law, but if the trier of fact finds a firearm as defined
in Section 76-10-501 was used, carried, or possessed on his person or in his
immediate possession during the commission or in furtherance of the
offense, the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a
term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and the court
may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term
not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently.
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (lXaXiv) is guilty of a
first degree felony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term
of not less than seven years and which may be for life. Imposition or
execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not
eligible for probation.
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful:
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of
his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter;
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any
building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place
knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons
unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in
any of those locations; or
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an
altered or forged prescription or written order for a controlled substance.

(u) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the
^ J i S T ? t h a n *? o u n c e s \ b u t > s * than 100 pounds, or a
controlled substance analog, is guilty of a third degree felony; or
(ui) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted
resin from any part of the plant, and the amount is more than one
ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2XaXi) while inside
the exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as
defined in Section 64-13-1 or any pubhc jail or other place of confinement
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided m
Subsection (2Kb).
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any
controlled substance by a person, that person shall be sentenced to a one
degree greater penalty than provided in this Subsection (2).
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all other
controlled substances not included in Subsection (2)(b)(i), (u), or (m),
including less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction the person is
guilty of a third degree felony.
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(ii) or (2)(a)(in) is:
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor;
(li) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and
(hi) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree
felony.
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionallyd) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a
controlled substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked,
suspended, or issued to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining
a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself to
be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or other authorized person;
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to
procure the administration of, to obtain a prescnption for, to prescribe
or dispense to any person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain
possession of, or to procure the administration of any controlled
substance by misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose his
receiving any controlled substance from another source, fraud, forgery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescnption or written order
for a controlled substance, or the use of a false name or address;
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a
controlled substance, or to utter the same, or to alter any prescnption
or written order issued or written under the terms of this chapter; or
(iv) to make, distnbute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or
other thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark,
trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or
any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or
labeling so as to render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) is guilty of a
third degree felony.
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties:
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not
authorized under this chapter who commits any act declared to be
unlawful under this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances
Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under
Subsection (4Kb) if the act is committed:
(i) in a public or pnvate elementary or secondary school or on the
grounds of any of those schools;
(u) m a public or pnvate vocational school or postsecondary institution or on the grounds of any of those schools or institutions;
(ni) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other
structure or grounds which are, at the time of the act, being used for
an activity sponsored by or through a school or institution under
a m

(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center;
(vi) in a church or synagogue;
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater,
movie house, playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto;
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure;
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included
in Subsections (4)(a)(i) through (viii); or
(x) in the immediate presence of a person younger than 18 years of
age, regardless of where the act occurs.
(b) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of a first
degree felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years
if the penalty that would otherwise have been established but for this
subsection would have been a first degree felony. Imposition or execution
of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for
probation.
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established
would have been less than a first degree felony but for this Subsection (4),
a person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of one degree more
than the maximum penalty prescribed for that offense.
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this Subsection (4) that the
actor mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at
the time of the offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor
that the actor mistakenly believed that the location where the act occurred
was not as described in Subsection (4)(a) or was unaware that the location
where the act occurred was as described in Subsection (4)(a).
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class
B misdemeanor.
(6) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and
not in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by
law.
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of
another state, conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of
another state for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state.
(7) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which
shows a person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or
dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence that
the person or persons did so with knowledge of the character of the substance
or substances.
(8) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the
course of his professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing,
dispensing, or administering controlled substances or from causing the substances to be administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction and
supervision.
(9) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on:
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act who
manufactures, distributes, or possesses an imitation controlled substance
for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a registered practitioner in the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate
scope of his employment.
(10) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to
any person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter
shall be given effect without the invalid provision or application.

58-37a-5. Unlawful acts.
(1) It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent to use, drug
paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture,
compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack!
store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled
substance into the human body in violation of this chapter. Any person who
violates this subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
(2) It is unlawful for any person to deliver, possess with intent to deliver, or
manufacture with intent to deliver, any drug paraphernalia, knowing that the
drug paraphernalia will be used to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest,
manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze,
pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or otherwise
introduce a controlled substance into the human body in violation of this act.
Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(3) Any person 18 years of age or over who delivers drug paraphernalia to a
person under 18 years of age who is three years or more younger than the
person making the delivery is guilty of a third degree felony.
(4) It is unlawful for any person to place in this state in any newspaper,
magazine, handbill, or other publication any advertisement, knowing that the
purpose of the advertisement is to promote the sale of drug paraphernalia. Any
person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.

appropriate headings and in the order indicated:
( D A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency
whose judgment or order is sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of
the case on appeal contains the names of all such parties. The list should be set
out on a separate page which appears immediately inside the cover.
(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with page
references.
(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with
parallel citations, rules, statutes and other authorities cited, with references to
the pages of the brief where they are cited.
(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court.
(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for eact\ issue:
the standard of appellate review with supporting authority; and
(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial
court; or
(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in
the trial court.
(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations
whose interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to
the appeal shall be set out verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the
pertinent part of the provision is lengthy, the citation alone will suffice, and the
provision shall be set forth in an addendum to the brief under paragraph (11)
of this rule.
(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the
nature of the case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the court
below. A statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for review shall
follow. All statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be
supported by citations to the record in accordance with paragraph le) of this
rule.
(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably
paragraphed, shall be a succinct condensation of the arguments actually made
in the body of the brief It shall not be a mere repetition of the heading under
which the argument is arranged.
(9) An argument The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of
the appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for
reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on. A party challenging a
fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged
finding.
(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought
(11) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is necessary
under this paragraph. The addendum shall be bound as part of the brief unless
doing so makes the brief unreasonably thick. If the addendum is bound
separately, the addendum shall contain a table of contents. The addendum
shall contain a copy of:
(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central
importance cited in the brief but not reproduced verbatim in the brief;
(B) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of Appeals
opinion; in all cases any court opinion of central importance to the appeal but
not available to the court as part of a regularly published reporter service; and
(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance to the
determination of the appeal, such as the challenged instructions, findings of
fact and conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the transcript of the court's
oral decision, or the contract or document subject to construction.
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the
requirements of paragraph (a) of this rule, except that the appellee need not
include:
(1) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is dissatisfied
with the statement of the appellant; or
(2) an addendum, except to provide material not included in the addendum
of the appellant. The appellee may refer to the addendum of the appellant.

reply to the response of the appellant to the issues presented by the crossappeal Reply bnefs shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth in
the opposing bnef The content of the reply bnef shall conform to the
requirements of paragraph (a)(2), (3), (9), and (10) of this rule No further
bnefs may be filed except with leave of the appellate court.
(d) References in briefs to parties Counsel will be expected m their bnefe
and oral arguments to keep to a minimum references to parties by such
designations as "appellant* and "appellee " It promotes clanty to use the
designations used in the lower court or in the agency proceedings, or the actual
names of parties, or descnptive terms such as "the employee," "the injured
person," "the taxpayer," etc.
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the pages
of the onginal record as paginated pursuant to Rule 1Kb) or to pages of any
statement of the evidence or proceedings or agreed statement prepared
pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g) References to pages of published depositions or
transcnpts shall identify the sequential number of the cover page of each
volume as marked by the clerk on the bottom nght corner and each separately
numbered page(s) referred to within the deposition or transcnpt as marked by
the transcriber References to exhibits shall be made to the exhibit numbers If
reference is made to evidence the admissibility of which is in controversy,
reference shall be made to the pages of the record at which the evidence was
identified, offered, and received or rejected.
(f) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, principal bnefs shall
not exceed 50 pages, and reply bnefs shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of
ages containing the table of contents, tables of citations and any addendum
containing statutes, rules, regulations, or portions of the record as required by
paragraph (a) of this rule In cases involving cross-appeals, paragraph (g) of
[^5 rule sets forth the length of bnefs
(g) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals If a cross-appeal is filed, the party
firstfilinga notice of appeal shall be deemed the appellant for the purposes of
fas rule and Rule ?6, unless the parties otherwise agree or the court otherwise
orders. The bnef of the appellant shall not exceed 50 pages in length The bnef
of the appellee/cross-appellant shall contain the issues and arguments involved in the cross-appeal as well as the answer to the bnef of the appellant
and shall not exceed 50 pages in length. The appellant shall then file a bnef
which contains an answer to the ongmal issues raised by the appellee/crossappellant and a reply to the appellee's response to the issues raised in the
appellant's opening bnef. The appellant's second bnef shall not exceed 25
pages m length. The appellee/cross-appellant may then file a second bnef, not
to exceed 25 pages in length, which contains only a reply to the appellant's
answers to the onginal issues raised by the appellee/cross-appellant's first
bnef. The lengths specified by this rule are exclusive of table of contents, table
of authonties, and addenda and may be exceeded only by permission of the
court. The court shall grant reasonable requests, for good cause shown.
(h) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees In cases
involving more than one appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated for
purposes of the appeal, any number of either may join in a single bnef, and any
appellant or appellee may adopt by reference any part of the bnef of another
Parties may similarly join in reply bnefs.
(l) Citation of supplemental authorities When pertinent and significant
authonties come to the attention of a party after that party's bnef has been
filed, or after oral argument but before decision, a party may promptly advise
the clerk of the appellate court, by letter setting forth the citations An ongmal
letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme Court. An onginal letter
and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. There shall be a
reference either to the page of the bnef or to a point argued orally to which the
citations pertain, but the letter shall without argument state the reasons for
the supplemental citations. Any response shall be made within 7 days of filing
and shall be similarly limited.
(j) Requirements and sanctions. All bnefs under this rule must be concise,
presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and free
from burdensome, irrelevant, immatenal or scandalous matters Bnefs which
are not m compliance may be disregarded or stncken, on motion or sua sponte
by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees against the offending
lawyer.
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1
2
3

THE CLERK:

Case number 001100222, State of Utah

versus Corinne Skidmore.
THE COURT:

Mr. Breeze is present together with the

4

defendant.

5

submitted to the court on June 15th of this year. Ms.

6

Skidmore pled guilty to first degree felony, distribution of

7

me t hamphe t ami ne.

8
9

The presentence report has been prepared and

Any changes or corrections to the report, Mr. Breeze?
MR. BREEZE:

There is one, Your Honor.

That is

10

that the presentence report indicates that the matrix would

11

be in the black, indicating a mandatory prison sentence. It

12

actually falls within the intermediate sanction category,

13

which they've circled on the form one, criminal history

14

assessment thatf s attached to the back of the report.

15

THE COURT:

Okay.

I see that.

I also should

16

indicate for the record that there has been submitted to the

17

court letters, subsequent letters, that were not included in

18

the report, which I have reviewed.

19

MR. BREEZE:

Go ahead.

Your Honor, first of all I would like

20

to get Mr. Ward to agree that under the applicable statute

21

that, because this was without the enhancement of being

22

within 1,000 feet of the public school there in Lewiston,

23

that this wouldn't be a mandatory prison sentence.

24

the controlled substance statute, this is not a mandatory

25

prison sentence and so you do have the option of a lesser
r\^**,A

o

So under

1

punishment.

2
3

THE COURT:

That's what I understand.

And I don't

think the state is arguing any different.

4

MR. WARD:

That's my understanding of the statute.

5

MR. BREEZE:

Your Honor, I guess the very first

6

thing that I want to say is I made a motion to sentence this

7

as a second degree felony.

8

the court that Ms. Skidmore, that this was her first

9

involvement in the criminal justice system.

10

error.

In that motion I indicated to

That was in

She actually had a DUI in 1982 and a DUI in 83.

11

THE COURT:

I saw that there were the two old DUIs.

12

MR. BREEZE:

I wanted to bring that to the court's

13

attention.

14

don't already know when I say that the plague of

15

methamphetamine is just a scourge on society.

16

is involved in the court system sees the damage that this

17

drug does, the power of this drug to destroy lives.

18

Your Honor, I'm not telling you anything you

Everybody who

A few months back, actually about a year back, I was

19

w o r k i n g o n a federal m e t h a m p h e t a m i n e case a n d in the course

20

of that I h a d the o c c a s i o n to learn about the h i s t o r y of

21

methamphetamine and how it has spread throughout the United

22

States.

23

that to the court's attention.

24
25

It quite surprised me.

I thought I should bring

What I learned was that the primary ingredient of
methamphetamine is the precursor chemical ephedrine.

1

Virtually all of the ephedrine, with the exception of

2

pseudoephedrine which is manufactured in a lab, virtually

3

all the ephedrine on planet earth grows in a province of

4

communist China.

5

particular plant grows.

6

That's the only place where this

There's a cousin to that plant that is used to make

7

Brigham tea in Utah.

It grows out in the desert in

8

basically the same fashion.

9

DEA is concerned that the chemists are getting to the point

It's my understanding that the

10

now where they're on the verge of being able to take that

11

plant and produce ephedrine, or a form of ephedrine, that

12

can then become methamphetamine.

13

What Ifm saying, Your Honor, is that this insidious,

14

diabolical, Satanic drug takes a route from ports in

15

communist China.

16

And it's not regulated in Mexico.

17

manufacture it down there in high quality laboratories at a

18

very low price.

19

Now, there's a lot that's manufactured in these mini labs,

20

but the vast majority of methamphetamine that's destroying

21

our country does come up from Mexico.

22

It goes to Mexico where it's off-loaded.
They are able to

Then they bring it into the United States.

Ms. Skidmore, as you can tell by reading the report, is

23

just a very common, ordinary country person who, with the

24

exception of a trip to Disneyland or California when she was

25

a child, has really never traveled more than a hundred miles

1

from her home. And she is just a very basic human being who

2

fell prey to this insidious evil drug.

3

report indicates the extent of her involvement and how her

4

life went downhill in a hurry because of her use of this

5

substance.

6

The presentence

There was a time when she was married.

And in fact

7

probably one of the best things you can say about Ms.

8

Skidmore is that she has two adult daughters that are

9

present.

Will you two stand?

Both of these young women are

10

very decent productive members of society.

11

raised these daughters, as you can tell from the report,

12

basically by herself.

13

led her to get involved with this drug, she did that.

14

Ms. Skidmore

For whatever personal weaknesses that

Your Honor knows from sitting on the bench and seeing

15

the endless stream of methamphetamine cases that come before

16

you, that the pull of this drug and the power of

17

methamphetamine is unlike any drug that we've ever seen

18

before.

19
20

21

M r . W a r d a n d I -- there is o n e m a t t e r that w e need to
a p p r o a c h t h e b e n c h o n , if w e m a y .

(Discussion at the bench, not recorded.)

22

MR. BREEZE: As far as mitigating factors in this

23

case, one of the letters that Your Honor received was from

24

Bear River Mental Health that indicates that Ms. Skidmore

25

has submitted urine samples on a regular basis since her

1

arrest in this case.

2

positive.

3

report they mention seven, but there's --

4
5

Not one of them has turned out to be

We actually have copies of those and in that

THE COURT:

In the letter from Bear River Drug and

Alcohol it says seven.

6

MR. BREEZE:

We actually have four more clean UA's.

7

I think one thing that struck me when Ms. Skidmore came

8

to see me was that she just looked absolutely horrible, Your

9

Honor.

I mean, Mr. Ward, I believe, can verify this, that

10

she looked like walking death.

11

skin and bones.

12

think Mr. Ward and I are both amazed at the inner strength

13

that Ms. Skidmore has demonstrated in being able to go ahead

14

and not use and to voluntarily get into treatment and to not

15

continue to use methamphetamine.

16

important mitigating factor.

17

She was just nothing but

Given the strength of methamphetamine, I

I think that's a very

She is clearly amenable to supervision.

She's probably

18

one the most obedient candidates for probation that you'll

19

ever have.

20

been working seven days a week since this happened.

21

already talked about her daughters.

22

son.

23

illegal activities since the arrest in this case.

24

actually done well in treatment, as the letter indicates.

25

She does have a good employment record.

She's
I've

She also has a young

There has been no indication of involvement in any
She has

Ms. Skidmore is obviously not a sophisticated criminal
T*} -* / « T A

a

1

person, because she basically just confessed.

As soon as

2

the police arrested her she gave a complete confession.

3

She's also made full disclosure of all of her involvement to

4

the presentence investigator.

5

If Your Honor would be interested, Ms. Skidmore's

6

closest family members are all here. As you may have noted

7

from the report, her parents were killed in a car crash in

8

1995, both of them.

9

stand.

10

If the other family members here would

If Your Honor would like to hear from them, they do

have some comments.

11

THE COURT: All right.

12

MR. BREEZE:

13

THE COURT:

You can just stand there and speak from

MS. REESE:

I'm Corinnefs older sister so I've

14
15
16

Ms. Cosette Reese.

there.

known her all her life.

17

THE COURT:

I've read your letter.

18

MS. REESE:

She's basically a really good person.

19

V e r y loving, u n s e l f i s h .

20

THE COURT:

All right.

Thank you.

21

MR. BREEZE: And she has a brother, Victor Reese.

22

MR. REESE:

I'm Victor Reese.

The most I can say

23

about Corinne is she grew up on a farm.

24

has worked hard most of her life that I've seen.

25

hard time for us all when our parents died and she had
r% ~ — —.

She worked hard and
It was a

1

concerns with that, as most of us did.

2

herself around, as she's lived with me a couple of times,

3

and I've seen her pull herself together.

4

this is any different of a case than that.

5

this could be a turning point for her.

6

she's a very good sister.

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. BREEZE:

9

MANDY:

10

I watched her turn

I don't believe
I believe that

She's loved and

All right.
Mandy, would you (unintelligible)?

(Unintelligible).

MR. BREEZE:

Your Honor, what we're asking the

11

court to do is consider salvaging this human being.

12

in serious jeopardy in this case, but the chance of her --

13

if you were to give her a lesser punishment, the chance of

14

her running, I think, is pretty close to zero.

15

her to prison at any time.

16

She's

You can send

I think that the appropriate and just sentence in this

17

case would be a mixed sentence with some incarceration

18

combined with work release so that she can continue to

19

support her young son who is still a minor.

20

a chance if she --

21
22
23
24
25

THE COURT:

And to give her

The son is living with his father,

right?
MR. BREEZE:

He is, but she's still expected to

provide support.
THE COURT:

All right.

1

MR. BREEZE:

She's been going through the guardian

2

ad litem and you just received a weekend visitation, is that

3

correct?

4

made enough progress where all the parties agreed that that

5

would be appropriate.

6

She had an unsupervised visit this weekend.

She's

Your Honor, I mean, this is a person who almost for her

7

entire life has been basically a good human being and she's

8

made a terrible mistake by getting involved in

9

methamphetamine, as so many other people have.

I just

10

think, Your Honor, that she's salvageable, that she can be

11

treated.

12

and be a good member of society.

13

you could send her to prison at any time if she doesn't

14

strictly adhere to everything that Your Honor orders.

She wants to be treated.

She wants to get back
If that isn't the case,

15

Given the status of her life, I think that a mixed

16

sentence with some incarceration and some help from the

17

system to make sure she doesn't get back on drugs could

18

accomplish everything that needs to be done in this case.

19
20

THE COURT:

Thank you, Mr. Breeze.

do you have anything you'd like to tell me?

21

MS- SKIDMORE:

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. WARD:

24
25

Ms. Skidmore,

No, sir.

Mr. Ward.
Thank you, Your Honor.

I do have some

comments that I think are important to make.
The state has no doubt that Ms. Skidmore, at some basic
»^*^
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level, is a good person.

But at some point in time she made

a choice and that choice was to profit by the sale of
methamphetamine.

It was easy money.

It was a very low risk

endeavor in terms of being caught by the criminal justice
system.

That's evidenced by the fact that she participated

in the activity for several years before she was actually
apprehended.
She's been characterized as a fairly unsophisticated
first timer in criminal justice.

I would suggest to the

court that she was sophisticated enough after her arrest
that she doesn't put her trash out any more so that we can
grab it.

I went out with the officers and drove past her

residence, which sits right next to the school yard.

They

had information that perhaps this activity was continuing
and they wanted to do a trash run like they did earlier.
doesn't go out so they can't.

It

They can't find out, under

that technique of investigation, whether this has stopped or
not.
Perhaps she has stopped using methamphetamine.
she has.

I hope

The fact remains that when they entered the

residence she had 19.8 grams, which is just shy of an ounce.
It's about eight grams short of an ounce. About two-thirds,
almost three-quarters of an ounce.

My calculation, from

what she told the presentence investigation report writer,
indicates that somewhere between seven and eight pounds of
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1

methamphetamine flowed through Ms. Skidmore's hands and into

2

this community.

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. WARD:

Over what time period?
Over a two year, two-and-a-half year

5

period of time.

That is a significant quantity of,

6

probably, as has been characterized, one of the most evil,

7

vile drugs our society has ever or may ever see.

8

almost instantly addictive.

9

both to self and everybody around it.

It's

It is incredibly destructive

10

Ms. Skidmore, by making the choices, has not just hurt

11

herself and has not just hurt the community, but she's hurt

12

her entire family.

13

support her and vouch for the things that she's done in the

14

past.

15

here as well.

16

It's admirable that they're here to

Obviously they suffer as part of what has gone on
But the entire community has suffered.

Your Honor, the recommendation from Adult Probation and

17

Parole is prison.

The state thinks that is appropriate. If

18

not, Ms. Skidmore, who, given the quantity of drugs, the

19

l e n g t h of involvement -- I g o b a c k to m y n o t e s o n a similar

20

individual w e h a d w h o w a s m u c h y o u n g e r w h o w a s involved in

21

drug traffic, Ms. Elaiah Elijavic, she had three ounces in

22

two sales of cocaine.

23

except that she's a lot older and ought to know better. We

24

kind of give people a break for being youthful and not

25

having a full understanding sometimes of the import of their

Ms. Skidmore's not much different,

Da/-t^
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1

conduct.

But when you're Ms. Skidmore's age, have seen

2

society, have raised a family, you know what's going on.

3

You know what the effects are.

4

of mature years.

We expect more from people

5

There needs to be a very clear message to the rest of

6

the community, in terms of a general deterrence, that this

7

conduct cannot, will not, ever be tolerated.

8

this case refused in any way, shape or form to plea bargain

9

down from a first degree felony.

The state in

This case would either go

10

to trial or it was going to be pled as it was charged.

11

That's how strongly the state felt about this case.

12

how strongly we still feel about this case; and that's how

13

strongly we feel about every other similar case that comes

14

to light from now on.

15

That's

We cannot have people selling meth in this community

16

period.

17

prison, because that's the only way we can guarantee that it

18

stops.

19

If they do, they need the severe consequence of

I'm going to submit it on that basis.

20

THE COURT: All right.

21

MR. BREEZE:

Mr. Breeze.

Your Honor, I stand by what I said. I

22

think that sentencing this as a second degree felony and

23

imposing a mixed sentence can serve all of the needs that

24

need to be served.

25

15 hanging over her would serve all the needs.

A stay in the county jail with a one to
I believe

1

that a five to life, given her criminal history, is probably

2

excessive, given the efforts she's made.

3

THE COURT: All right.

Thank you.

Ms. Skidmore,

4

your case today has caused me more concern than all the

5

cases I've got for sentencing today.

6

time going over this report, looking at the file, trying to

7

decide what to do.

8
9

Ifve spent a lot of

On one hand I see a person that has very minimal
involvement with the criminal justice system.

I see a

10

person that's got relatively good family support. I

11

appreciate them here today and the comments that they've

12

made.

13

In the presentence report you were very upfront with

14

AP&P and with the police.

15

concerning that.

16

There's been some discussion

The difference between what Mr. Ward points out, as far

17

as another sentencing case, is that that was purely for

18

profit.

Yours was for profit and for your own use.

19

The problem that I've got with this case, and what

20

causes me so much concern, is that when the police did come

21

to your house there were almost 20 grams of meth.

22

over $1,500 worth of cash. And your day planner contained

23

names and dollar amounts and people you had sold drugs to.

24

This just wasn't simply you using.

25

from Lewiston Elementary school.

There was

It was one house away

1

You sold, you told the probation officer, because it

2

was an easy way to make money.

3

two-and-a-half years for an income to support your habit.

4

And I appreciate the fact that you were honest with AP&P

5

when you did tell them that, but that's a lot of sales over

6

that point in time, a lot of distribution.

7

lives affected by this terrible drug, as Mr. Breeze has so

8

eloquently pointed out.

9

You sold for over

That's a lot of

In your own statements to AP&P you were using a half to

10

one ounce per week, using and selling.

11

drugs over two-and-a-half years of this terrible drug being

12

distributed through this community.

13

And that is a lot of

I have looked at and weighed very carefully, is there

14

any other thing I can look at besides prison?

15

are things I could look at.

16

my job is to weigh not only punishment to you, but also

17

deterrence to you for the future. And I think that you're

18

well on the way for yourself as far as controlling this

19

habit, but you need more than just walking away cold turkey.

20

Then there is also general deterrence which needs to be

21

looked at as far as not allowing distribution of

22

methamphetamine in this community.

23

Yes, there

But you need to understand that

Based upon that I am going to follow --Mr. Breeze has

24

made an excellent, eloquent argument, but I want you to

25

understand my decision here today is based after a lot of
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1

deliberation, trying to figure out what's best for you and

2

what's best for this community.

3

recommendation.

4

in the Utah State prison.

5

I am going to follow the

I am sentencing to you five years to life

Now, let me tell you what I'm going to do.

I'm going

6

to write a letter to the parole board and I'm going to point

7

out to them certain things as far as what has been presented

8

here today and in the presentence report.

9

encourage them to look at various programs that may be

I'm going to

10

available as far as an early release into a halfway house, a

11

treatment center, that type of thing.

12

I will do that because I think, based upon the fact

13

that you were cooperative, you do have family support; but I

14

just cannot allow this to continue in this community.

15

one way I can stop it -- I don't know if I'll ever be able

16

to stop it.

17

this terrible drug, but I'll do what I can.

18

to -- the message needs to be sent that it won't happen. It

19

won't be allowed.

20

I don't know if we can ever stop the flow of

State Prison,

22

to the parole board.

23

a copy to you.

25

One way is

So you are sentenced to five years to life in the Utah

21

24

The

I will write that letter within the next week
I'll send a copy to Mr. Breeze to get

At this point in time there's not going to be any fine
incurred or assessed at this point.
Darro

1£

Let me just indicate to you, Ms. Corinne, don't give up
hope.

There's some wonderful programs down at the state

prison as far as drug and alcohol treatment.
programs available to you for education.

There's

You can get your

college degree down there over the internet and over
satellite.

Take advantage of those opportunities.

The

parole board will look at those as far as what release they
give to you.

But it's all up to you, as far as what you

take advantage of down there.
Any questions?
MR. BREEZE:

I don't suppose Your Honor would

consider imposing this as a one to 15?

That would give the

Board plenty of discretion to either --if she does
extremely well, to act on the low end; and if she doesn't do
well to act on the high end.
THE COURT: Any argument on that?
MR. WARD:

The state is opposed to a 76-3-402

motion for all the reasons I made in my argument.
THE COURT:

Give the facts and circumstances as

I've reviewed the report and the case, I will deny that
motion.
MR. BREEZE:

Very well, Your Honor.

(Hearing concluded.)
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1

THE CLERK:

Case number 001100222, State of Utah

2

versus Corinne Skidmore.

3

for the record.

4

MR. WARD:

5

MR. BREEZE:

6

Bruce Ward for the state.
Robert Breeze for Ms. Skidmore, Your

Honor.

7

THE COURT:

8
9

Counsel, please state your names

Good morning, Mr. Breeze, Mr. Ward.

This is the time set for a pretrial conference.

Have you

I been able to resolve it?

10

MR. BREEZE:

Your Honor, they've made a plea offer

11 I that we're willing to accept.
12

THE COURT:

13

MR. BREEZE:

14 J this time.

All right.
So we're prepared to enter a plea at

It would be a plea as charged.

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. BREEZE:

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. WARD:

19 J

THE COURT:

To a first degree felony?
That's correct, Your Honor.
All right.

Is that the plea agreement?

It is.
Mr. Breeze, have you reviewed with Ms.

20 I Skidmore a plea - - a statement by the defendant?
21
22

MR. BREEZE:

I have, Your Honor.

I have one

additional copy.

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. BREEZE:

25

THE COURT:

All right.
I have the original here.
Okay.

I appreciate counsel doing this.

1

I have a hard time getting local counsel to do a statement by

2

defendant in advance of a plea and a plea agreement and

3

certificate of counsel.

4

and doing it, Mr. Breeze.

5

I appreciate you taking care of this

Ms. Skidmore, there's some questions I need to review

6

with you.

7

with Mr. Breeze about your constitutional rights, there's

8

some things I'm required to review with you by law.

9

to make sure that your plea is done voluntarily, knowingly

10
11 I
12

Even though you've sat down at length and visited

and intelligently.
Are you presently under the influence of any drugs or
alcohol?

13

MS. SKIDMORE: No.

14 J

THE COURT: Are you presently receiving any

15

treatment for mental or physical illness?

16

MS. SKIDMORE: No.

17

THE COURT:

18

That's

Has anyone made any promises to you that

are causing you to plead guilty?

19

M S . SKIDMORE:

20

THE COURT:

21

MS. SKIDMORE: No.

22

THE COURT: Are you pleading guilty because in fact

23

No.

Is a n y o n e f o r c i n g y o u to p l e a d g u i l t y ?

you are guilty?

24

MS. SKIDMORE:

25

THE COURT:

(No audible response.)

Ms. Skidmore, you understand that when

you do plead guilty you waive or you give up constitutional
rights that you do have?

Those constitutional rights are

guaranteed to you under the United States constitution and
the Utah State constitution.

They are that first of all you

have the right to have a trial.

That could be a ]ury trial

or it could be a trial to the court.

It has to be a speedy

trial, also, and you're giving up that right when you plead
guilty.
At the trial the state would need to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt each element of the charge.

They would need

to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that on March 7th, 2000,
you did knowingly and intentionally possess methamphetamme,
a controlled or counterfeit substance, with intent to
distribute; and committed the offense within a thousand feet
of a school.

If they could not prove any one of those

elements, then you'd be found not guilty.
They have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each element
because under the constitution you are presumed innocent
until they do so.
plead guilty.

You give up that presumption when you

Also, you give up your right against

self-incrimination.
testify in court.

That means that nobody can force you to
It also means that when you do plead

guilty you are incriminating yourself.
You also give up your right to put on your own defense at
a trial, to cross-examine and confront witness and to have

4

1

witnesses subpoenaed and compelled to come testify on your

2

own behalf.

3

conviction from the court.

And you give up your right to appeal any
Your appeals are very, very

4 J limited after you end up entering a guilty plea.
5

Do you understand that when you plead guilty, Ms.

6

Skidmore, that you waive or give up all of those

7

constitutional rights?

8

MS. SKIDMORE:

9

THE COURT:

(No verbal response.)

Do you understand that?

10

MS. SKIDMORE: Yes.

11

THE COURT:

Okay.

Now, do you have any other

12 I questions that you want to ask Mr. Breeze or cover with Mr.
13 J Breeze before I take your plea?
14

MS. SKIDMORE: No.

15

THE COURT:

If there's anything else now is the time

16 J to talk with Mr. Breeze.

If you have any questions or issues

17 I you want to review with him, you need to bring it up now.
18 I It's just if you have any.
19
20

I'm not asking you to make any

up.
All right.

You need to understand, Ms. Skidmore, that

21

you're pleading guilty to a first degree felony.

The maximum

22

penalty that could be imposed is five years to life in the

23

Utah State Prison plus a fine of $10,000 and an 85 percent

24

surcharge.

25

penalty that could be imposed in this case?

Do you understand that that is the maximum

1

MS. SKIDMORE: Yes.

2

THE COURT:

3

All right.

Mr. Ward, would you briefly

state a factual basis for this plea?

4

MR. WARD:

Your Honor, on the date alleged in the

5

information, in Cache County, state of Utah, a no-knock

6

search warrant was served on Ms. Skidmore's residence in

7

Lewiston.

8

that she just came from a house where she'd taken drugs.

9

Asked if she would show where the drugs were in the house she

She indicated, when the officers entered the home,

10

stated that she would.

11

box.

12

large rock of crank or methamphetamine; the other a large

13

amount of crystal meth.

14

a tourniquet, spoon, glass pipe, straws and numerous plastic

15

baggies and envelopes. Also seized were $1,580 from a gray

16

metal cash box and $2 06 from her day planner.

17 J
18

She took the officers to a strong

There were two plastic containers.

One contained a

There were plastic scales, syringes,

This residence is one house away from the Lewiston
elementary school.

19

The drugs that were seized were sent to the crime lab.

20

9.5 grams of methamphetamine were found in the red plastic

21

container and 10.3 grams in the black plastic container.

22

Those constituted an amount substantially in excess of what

23

is normal for personal use.

24

THE COURT:

25

Mr. Breeze, any other facts that need to

be added that you know of?

MR. BREEZE:
search warrant.

Just that the --it was pursuant to a

They had done a garbage grab and had

searched the garbage that was on the street and found
syringes and other evidence.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

Ms. Skidmore, before I take

your plea I also need to inform you that after I've taken
your plea, if you so desire to withdraw your guilty plea, the
only way you can do that is by filing a written motion with
the court within 30 days from today's date.

You must show

good cause why it should be withdrawn and the court would
have to find good cause to withdraw it.
All right. As to the charge of possession of a
controlled substance with intent to distribute in a drug free
zone, a first degree felony, arising on or about March 7th,
2000, how do you plead, not guilty or guilty?
MS. SKIDMORE:
THE COURT:

Guilty.

I will accept your guilty plea.

I do

find that it is freely, voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently made.

The record should reflect that Mr.

Breeze is having Ms. Skidmore sign the statement of defendant
in advance of plea, plea agreement and certificate of counsel
and order.
MR. BREEZE:
THE COURT:

Mr. Ward and I have both signed.
I'll have this copy returned to you,

Mr. Breeze.

n

1

MR. WARD:

Your Honor, the state would move to have

2

count two, the drug paraphernalia charge, dismissed 3 0 days

3

after sentencing.

4
5

THE COURT:
count two.

6
7

On the amended information there is no

MR. WARD:

If I filed an amended -- I wasn't aware

that I had.

8

THE COURT:

9

J only has one count.

10

MR. WARD:

11

THE COURT:

There is an amended information and it

Very well.
Ms. Skidmore and Mr. Breeze have signed

12

the statement of plea.

13

order.

14

All right.

I will also go ahead and sign the

Since this is a felony case, I'm going to

15

order a presentence report be prepared and submitted to the

16

court.

17

given a referral to go see Adult Probation and Parole.

What that means, Ms. Skidmore, is that you will be
That

18 J has their address on it. You need to get right over and see
19 I them to begin that process of preparing the report.
20

They'll prepare the report and send a copy to Mr. Breeze

21

and to Mr. Ward prior to sentencing.

You'll have a chance to

22

visit with Mr. Breeze and talk about and review the report

23

with him.

We will set sentencing for July 25th.

24

MR. BREEZE:

25

THE COURT:

That's fine.

What time would that be?

That will be at 9 a.m.

That's when

1

you'll need to be back in court, Ms. Skidmore.

2

J a bench warrant will issue for your arrest.

3

I understand that?

4

MS. SKIDMORE:

5

THE COURT:

6

Do you

(No audible response.)

Any other issues, Mr. Breeze or Mr.

Ward?

7

MR. BREEZE:

8

MR. WARD:

9

If you're not

I

THE COURT:

No, Your Honor.

No.
Thank you.

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

|

(Hearing concluded.)
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THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the audio taped hearing was

4

transcribed by me, Rodney M. Felshaw, a Certified Court

5

Reporter and Certified Court Tape Transcriber in and for the

6

State of Utah, residing at Brigham City, Utah.

7

That a full, true and correct transcription of the

8

hearing, to the best of my ability, is set forth in the pages

9

numbered 2 to 9, inclusive.

10

I further certify that the original transcript was

11

filed with the Court Clerk, First District Court, Cache

12

County, Logan, Utah.

13
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14
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15
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16
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17
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